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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, a state bill mirroring the federal Unborn Victims of Vio-
lence Act,2 also known as Laci and Conner's Law, failed passage in
the North Carolina legislature.3 If a similar bill passes in the future,
North Carolina courts will face many decisions of statutory interpreta-
1. J.D. (University of San Diego), LL.M. (Victoria University at Wellington, New Zea-
land), Clinical Supervising Attorney (Domestic Violence Advocacy Project, North Carolina
Central University School of Law). The production of this article was supported by Award No.
180-1-04-4VA-AW-530 awarded by the U.S. Dept. of Justice, through the N.C. Dept. of Crime
Control & Public Safety/Governor's Crime Commission. The opinions, findings, and conclusions
or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Dept. of Justice. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assis-
tance of Nancy Mayer, a law student in the NCCU Pro Bono Program assigned to the Domestic
Violence Advocacy Project. The author would also like to extend her appreciation to the out-
standing work and effort of the editorial staff of the North Carolina Central University Law
Journal.
2. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1841 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2005).
3. H.B. 1324, 2005-2006 Sess. (N.C. 2005). The North Carolina bill stalled in the House
Judiciary Committee.
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tion and likely force the hand of the state legislature to determine the
very meaning of a human being under the law.
Although similar but unsuccessful efforts to pass a federal fetal
homicide statute began in 1999, 4 the federal Unborn Victims of Vio-
lence Act was enacted in 2004 following the 2002 death of Laci and
Conner Peterson in California.' When Laci Peterson, eight and a half
months pregnant, and her unborn child, Conner, were found dead, the
nation mourned their loss. That Laci Peterson was murdered while
pregnant heightened the cry for the severest of punishments for her
convicted husband, and indeed, he received a capital sentence. 6 Ac-
countability for the death of Conner, however, was not fully allowed
by statute in the State of California, where only one murder charge,
not two, could be brought. The fetus7 was not a "person" under the
applicable statute.
The Peterson family responded by advocating for a federal law rec-
ognizing the death of a fetus as the death of a legal person and full
human being. Laci and Conner's Law was thus enacted to create a
second crime of murder for the death of the fetus when a pregnant
woman is assaulted.8 As a federal crime, it only applies under limited
federal jurisdiction. It would not have applied to the Peterson case
had it been a law in force at the time of the murder. Nevertheless, it
has served as a template for state legislatures that have subsequently
drafted and passed similar statutes under state law.
The current increase in the number of fetal homicide statutes has
concerned women's rights activists, including domestic violence victim
advocates.9 Many fetal homicides are a result of spousal homicide.
Some women's rights activists fear the legal recognition of fetal homi-
cide will undermine the proper focus on the harm to the slain woman,
and place a woman's abortion rights and general right to privacy in
jeopardy. While fetal homicide statutes inherently focus on the fetus
4. Unborn Victims of Violence Act, H.R. 2436, 106th Cong. (1999).
5. For a review of the legislative history of the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Acts
and competing statutes, such as the Motherhood Protection Act, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003),
see Shannon M. McQueeney, Recognizing Unborn Victims Over Heightening Punishment for
Crimes Against Pregnant Women, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 461, 473-479
(2005).
6. For a chronological history of the case, see http://www.lacipeterson.com/whatshappen-
ing/index.html; http://www.nbc11.com/news/1883355/detail.html (last visited April 1, 2006).
7. "Fetus" is the term used for unborn humans throughout this discussion because that is
the term most commonly used in legal decisions concerning their rights. The author recognizes
that embryo, fetus and child are medically distinct beings. Where courts and legislatures have
narrowly defined a "fetus," such distinctions are noted within.
8. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1841 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2005).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth Spiezer, Recent Developments in Reproductive Health Law and the
Constitutional Rights of Women: The Role of the Judiciary in Regulating Maternal Health and
Safety, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 507 (2005).
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as a "person" to be protected, this is by no means a novel approach in
American law. For decades, both civil and criminal laws across the
country have recognized the "fetus" as a legal person in certain cir-
cumstances. Nonetheless, to date, none of these laws has infringed
upon the constitutional privacy rights of women to seek a lawful abor-
tion under state law. Fetal homicide statutes uniformly exempt wo-
men who obtain lawful abortions from criminal indictment. However,
even with the abortion exemption legally secure, it is a persuasive ar-
gument that the "rhetoric" of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
"will likely color the abortion debate and the legal battles of the next
century."1 °
The concern is how this dichotomy of protection of both mother
and child can be sustained. Will the current trend of our precedent
ensure the longevity of the woman's right to an abortion as well as the
fetus's right to live and be protected from harm, and if so under what
policy and rationale? The array of decisions upholding the mother's
right to kill the fetus and the fetus's right to live have proffered a
diverse number of competing and contradictory rationales. Therefore,
in designing laws that address both the interests of the mother and the
fetus, it is crucial that legislative intent is clear both in the statutory
language and the legislative record. Without clarity, speculation as to
the strength of the mother's and/or fetus's rights will be intensely so-
cially divisive.
For example, if an abortion right is sustained based on recognition
of the undue burden that an unwanted pregnancy places on a woman,
a justification defense to murder may be implied. If the abortion right
is viewed as a mother's individual right, a significantly lesser right in
the minor child may be implied, in line with the superior status
mothers' rights are often given in relation to both fathers' rights and
children's rights. In states where fetal rights are given little or no rec-
ognition, the rationale behind a woman's abortion right is neither jus-
tification nor superseding power, but simply the privacy right over
one's own body against state interference.
A state legislature has many choices among the various rationales
supporting fetal rights, whether focusing on the fetus as a human be-
ing, as a full legal person, as a minor with limited rights, or simply as
the "potentiality of life" as expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade." As national trends emerge as to which ratio-
nales are more favored, the timeless potential conflict between a
10. Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS 215, 235 (2002).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (holding the potentiality of human life becomes a
compelling state interest at the point of viability) [hereinafter Roe].
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mother's rights and her unborn child's rights during pregnancy, the
very point at which they are inextricably bonded, will take shape in
the legal landscape, challenging our diverse and deep moral convic-
tions about life and death, individual rights and social obligations, and
the status of parent and child.
In failing to pass the Unborn Victims of Violence Act in 2005,
North Carolina very narrowly avoided the need for clarification of fe-
tal rights in the criminal justice system. Yet, North Carolina is particu-
larly ripe for judicial and legislative attention to this issue. North
Carolina currently lacks statutory definitions of a human being and a
fetus for criminal application. In addition, since the 1989 North Caro-
lina Supreme Court decision in State v. Beale, 2 the North Carolina
appellate courts have not reexamined whether to continue to apply
the common law definition of a human being as only a live birth for
the purpose of homicide statutes. This places North Carolina in a mi-
nority of jurisdictions that have not followed the national trend to ex-
pand the definition of a human being in homicide statutes to a being
alive from the age of conception. A careful consideration of the di-
verse rationales and potential impact of fetal homicide laws and fetal
and women's rights in general should be addressed before the North
Carolina legislature again considers enacting fetal homicide
legislation.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS
Understanding the various rationales for balancing maternal and fe-
tal rights requires a review of the historical development of those ra-
tionales, including consideration of the role of the state, and the
increasing rights of children as they develop.13 Minors as a whole are
viewed as a distinct class of human beings based on their extended
period of vulnerability and dependence prior to adulthood. 4 This sta-
tus has imposed both legal disabilities and special protections for the
young, which correspondingly diminish as the child approaches the
age of majority. At the discretion of courts and legislatures, the
12. State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989).
13. Numerous authors have outlined the early legal history of fetal rights. See, e.g., Eugene
Quay, Justifiable Abortions - Medical and Legal Foundations (pts. I & 2), 49 GEO. L.J. 173
(1960), 49 GEO. L.J. 395 (1961); Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a
Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty? 17 N.Y. LAW FORUM 335 (1971); Jeffrey
L. Lenow, The Fetus as Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 Am. J.L. & MED. 1 (1983); Mark
S. Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Failed
to Use, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 199 (1996): Michael S. Robbins, The Fetal Protection Act.
Redefining "Person" for the Purposes of Arkansas' Criminal Homicide Statutes, 84 ARK. L. REV.
75 (2001); JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY (2006).
14. See generally, MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 3 (2d ed. 2003).
4
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endpoint of legal childhood, the age of majority, as well as the incep-
tion of legal childhood and personhood, have changed substantially
over time.
For centuries, early common law did not envision the fetus as an
individual life until it had "quickened" around 16-18 weeks, that is,
when the mother could feel movement in the womb.15 The traditional
Biblical Apostles' Creed reads: "From thence He shall come to judge
the quick and the dead."16 According to Blackstone: "For if a woman
is quick with child, and... killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat
her whereby the child dieth in her body,... this though not murder
was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter."17 At common law,
therefore, abortion of fetuses before quickening may not have been
legally actionable. Even from early English settlement through the
time state legislatures first began to enact anti-abortion laws in the
early nineteenth century, as long as "quickening" was the defining
line, a mother and other third parties could not be charged for harm-
ing a fetus that had not yet quickened.18 Some scholars have noted
that this is not necessarily evidence of early protection of a mother's
right or disregard for fetal rights but rather an acceptance of an inabil-
ity to medically determine the existence of the fetus in earlier
centuries.1 9
A review of various legal actions, both civil and criminal, all point
to a growing recognition that the fetus has certain rights in certain
circumstances. This includes a review of fetal homicide statutes, civil
actions on behalf of fetuses, and child endangerment criminal actions
for harm to a fetus. No court, however, has granted the fetus the full
personhood enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
15. EDD DOERR & JAMES W. PRESCOTT (EDS.), ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL 'PER-
SONHOOD' xvi (2d ed. 1990). Note that early Greek, Roman and European law preceding En-
glish common law also vigorously debated whether the unborn child had a soul, and whether
abortion should be criminalized or made legal. See Abortion in Historical Context in THE ABOR-
TION CONTROVERSY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (Eva R. Rubin ed., 1994) (citing JAMES
HALL, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Abortion: Legal
Control, Report No. IB74019 (1976), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/
permalink/meta-crs-7702).
16. See, e.g., BOARD OF PUBLICATION OF THE METHODIST CHURCH, INC., BOOK OF HYMNS:
OFFICIAL HYMNAL OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH § 738 (1961); THE BOOK OF COMMON
PRAYER 54 (Charles Mortimer Guilbert, custodian 1979).
17. Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *129.
18. But see, JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY
(2006). Note the concept of quickening is a Western construct. For example, prior to the devel-
opment of British common law, "[in China the ages of individuals and their astrological desti-
nies were calculated not from the hour of birth but from the hour of conception." DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS: A HISTORY OF MAN'S SEARCH TO KNOW His WORLD AND HIM-
SELF 76 (1985).
19. See Phillip A. Rafferty, Roe v. Wade: A Scandal Upon the Court, Part I: The Unsettling
of Roe v. Wade, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2005).
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States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court in Roe clearly
held that the fetus may have certain rights, but it is not deemed a
"person" with the same protections of life granted to born children
and adults.2°
Similarly, in 1981, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Stam
v. State that "a human fetus is not a 'person' within the protection
guaranteed by Article I, Sections 1 and 19 of the North Carolina Con-
stitution."'2' The Court in Stam did not distinguish between different
developmental stages; it simply asserted that a fetus at any stage
would not be given the full constitutional protection of the following
provisions:
Article I, § 1. The Equality and Rights of Persons. We hold it to be
self-evident that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the
pursuit of happiness. 22
Article I, §19. Law of the Land; Equal Protection of the Laws. No
person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liber-
ties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of
his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person
be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, re-
23ligion, or national origin.
Thus, granting certain rights to the unborn does not necessarily imply
that they have been given the full constitutional rights of born per-
sons. Generally, the extent of the rights given to unborn children is
determined by their developmental stage, the weight of harm to the
children born, and the risk of harm to the interests of those who have
a duty to care for them and an interest in parenthood. Balancing the
competing multiple interests surrounding an unborn child is a complex
endeavor, but one which the courts have faced for some time in both
criminal and civil actions.
A. The National Trend to Enact Fetal Homicide Laws
Most scholars to date have asserted that early English common law
did not recognize the fetus in utero as a person for the purpose of
homicide charges.2 4 One explanation is the circular argument that the
fetus was not legally defined as a person (i.e., a fetus was not defined
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
21. Starn v. State, 275 S.E.2d 439, 441 (N.C. 1981).
22. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
23. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
24. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) ("The rule has been ac-
cepted as the established common law in every American jurisdiction that has considered the
question.").
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as a person because the law had not defined it as a person); another is
that medical scientific advances had not reached the point where the
actual cause of death of the fetus could be proven.25 As stated in the
16th century:
[I]f a man killed the child in the womb of its mother: this is not a
felony, neither shall he forfeit anything, and this so for two reasons:
first, because the thing killed has no baptismal name; second, because
it is difficult to judge whether he killed or not, that is, whether the
child died of this battery of its mother or through another cause.26
Two centuries later, however, as described in 1762, some harm to the
fetus became actionable, but not to the same extent as the killing of
the pregnant mother, which brought a death sentence:
... [i]f Men strive and hurt a Woman with Child, so that her Fruit
depart from her, and yet no Mischief follows, he shall be surely pun-
ished, according as the Woman's Husband will lay upon him, and he
shall pay as the Judges determine; And if any Mischief follow, then
thou shalt give Life for Life.27
In the year prior to the State's first statutory enactment of abortion
crimes in 1881, the North Carolina Supreme Court described its view
of the common law on this issue. It determined that common law pro-
vided a misdemeanor crime for inducing abortion after the mother is
quick with child, although early common law may have deemed it
murder.28
Generally under common law in the United States, a fetus could not
be "murdered," and its "life" was not valued or even recognized
under criminal law. The fetus was viewed as a part of the woman's
body, and therefore she was "the only 'person' legally capable of sus-
taining injury."' 29 However, a murder charge could result if the child
was born alive and then died as a result of injuries sustained in the
womb.3" "Born alive" usually required that the child had an existence
separate from the mother, such as breathing independently after the
umbilical cord was cut. 3 1 A pregnant mother, however, was rarely
prosecuted for contributing to or causing the death of an injured fetus
25. Judith C. Rosen et al., A Legal Perspective on the Status of the Fetus: Who Will Guard
the Guardians?, in ABORTION RiGHrrs AND FETAL 'PERSONHOOD' 29 (Edd Doerr & James W.
Prescott eds., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Rosen].
26. Id. (citing SIR WILLIAM STANFORD (1509-58), Book One, Chap. 13).
27. I WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, § 16 (4th ed.,
London, Richardson & Lintot 1762), reprinted in part in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A Doc-
UMENTARY HISTORY 6 (Eva R. Rubin ed. 1994).
28. State v. Slagle, 82 N.C. 653, 655 (1880) (per curiam).
29. Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (referring to the first case of pre-natal
injury to a child thereafter born alive, Dietrich v. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (Mass. 1884)).
30. See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59, 63 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 256 S.W. 433 (Tenn. 1923); Lane v. Commonwealth, 248
S.E.2d 781 (Va. 1978).
7
Brobst: The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in Nor
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2006
134 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:127
"born alive."' 32 Most mothers garnered sympathy and were found to
lack the criminal intent necessary to hold them accountable, as the
Courts may have viewed them as ignorant or incapable of care.33
Therefore, if a fetus died in the womb, regardless of cause, no crimi-
nal liability would attach with respect to harming the fetus. If the fe-
tus was injured but was born alive for however short a time, the
abusive father could be charged and convicted for his assault to
mother and child. However, the mother was deemed to have acted
merely negligently if she, who had the greatest ability to care for the
fetus, failed to do so, abandoning the newborn and causing its death.
Here we see early legal recognition of the undue burdens placed on
women as the sole physical caretakers of human life in its earliest
stages. However, the historical responsibility and duties placed on
mothers as primary caretakers of children has also imbued them with
greater power over the life and death of their children than that of
fathers, at least in the earliest stages of life. If a mother no longer
wished to be a mother, she could fail to feed the newborn; if the father
did the same he would likely end up in prison. This is in direct con-
trast to earliest Roman law, where patria potestas granted the father
but not the" mother the power of life and death (jus vitae necisque)
over their children.34
With regard to the fate of unwanted newborns, since the 1980s wo-
men and men increasingly are held to an equal standard of accounta-
bility, with the child's right to live given greatest weight. For example,
in 1998, a young mother whose abandonment killed her newborn re-
ceived a life sentence in prison.35 However, the burdens faced by
young mothers continue to be recognized in mitigation as well. For
example, in State v. Daniel, the North Carolina Supreme Court recog-
nized such mitigating factors when it reversed a life sentence of a
mother whose child died after she had abandoned it. 36
Some authors attribute New York in 1828 to have been the first
American state to criminalize all abortions, with the rationale being in
part to protect women from dangerous medical procedures in an age
before antibiotics.37 England's Lord Ellenborough's Act in 1803 had
32. ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND MATERIALS 320
(West 1999).
33. See State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954).
34. R.W. LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 58 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2d ed. 1949).
35. Robert Hanley, "Couple Receives Terms in Prison in Baby's Death," N.Y. Times, July
10, 1998, at Al, cited in ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 321, n.cc (West 1999).
36. State v. Daniel, 354 S.E.2d 216 (N.C. 1987).
37. See Rosen, supra note 25, at 32. Note that many authors refer to the published research
of Eugene Quay when designating the 1820s as the period of America's first abortion statutes.
See also Quay, supra note 13.
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preceded American law by statutorily prohibiting abortion several de-
cades earlier.38 By the end of the 1950s, a majority of states also
banned all abortions, with the sole defense to abortion the protection
of the life of the mother.39 However, many jurisdictions applied a
lesser penalty if the fetus had not quickened, again recognizing a
lesser fetal right based on lack of development. For example, the 1828
New York statute punished the killing of a quick fetus as second de-
gree manslaughter, and the killing of an unquick fetus as a
misdemeanor.4 °
Given the common law denial of personhood to fetuses, the current
trend towards inclusion of the fetus as a potential homicide victim has
been a product of primarily legislative reform since the 1970s. Thus,
increased criminal penalties for the killing of fetuses arose at the same
time as increased rights of women to lawful abortions. Roe was de-
cided in 1973.41 For example, in 1986 the California legislature en-
acted a feticide statute under California Penal Code § 187(a), after the
California Supreme Court refused to define a stillborn fetus as a law-
ful victim of homicide. As in many fetal homicide cases, the fetus had
died at the hands of its father who had violently assaulted its mother.4 a
Today, the common law view that unborn children are not "human
beings" or victims for the purpose of criminal actions continues to ex-
ist in only a minority of jurisdictions. For example, the Connecticut
Superior Court in State v. Anonymous, 43 declined to include the death
of an unborn child for the purpose of its murder statute and continued
to follow the common law born alive rule. The fetus had died as a
result of the shooting and killing of its pregnant mother.
Even in those jurisdictions that began to recognize the fetus as a
separate victim, the emphasis was often still on the injury to the
mother. For example, in 1983, although acts of domestic violence
caused the death of the fetus, the Kentucky Supreme Court primarily
focused on the harm to the estranged wife as a victim of assault.44
A clear majority of states have now criminalized the killing of a
fetus through statutory reform measures. Most state courts have de-
clined to define even a viable fetus as a human being for the purpose
of murder, manslaughter, and vehicular homicide crimes without ex-
38. Mark S. Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe At-
tempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 199, 252 (1996).
39. See Rosen, supra note 25, at 32-33.
40. Id. at 32.
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970), superseded by Cal. Penal Code
§ 187(a) (2004).
43. 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. 1986).
44. Hollis v. Kentucky, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983), overruled by Kentucky v. Morris, 142
S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 2004).
20061
9
Brobst: The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in Nor
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2006
136 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:127
press statutory authority. The courts have argued that to do so would
exceed judicial power and deny defendants their due process rights.45
In some states, the definition of a murder victim has been expanded
to include fetuses.46 For example, Indiana Code sections 35-42-1-1, -3,
and -4 expressly state that murder, voluntary manslaughter, and invol-
untary manslaughter, respectively, include a viable fetus as a possible
victim. In contrast, others have created a separate feticide statute.47
Many States, although no longer a majority, continue to follow the
pattern of more restrictive early common law and limit criminal liabil-
ity for harm to the fetus only after it is "quick" or viable. This ap-
proach of requiring a certain developmental stage has been criticized
by Nan Hunter of the ACLU's Reproductive Freedom Project who
argued:
All such laws lack an objective standard to determine whether the de-
fendant knows or should have known a woman is pregnant. Viability,
however, is not a useful concept in the feticide context. Viability oc-
curs at different points in different pregnancies and requires medical
expertise to diagnose .... Except in the very last stages of pregnancy,
no one other than a physician could be expected to know the fetus is
viable.48
The majority of states no longer require a certain developmental
stage of the fetus for a homicide conviction, thus avoiding the difficult
evidentiary requirement. The federal Laci and Conner's Law also car-
ries no such limitation. 49 However, they also do not require knowl-
edge of pregnancy, relying on the theory of transferred intent which
many argue is a step too far.
The breadth of fetal homicide statutes is directly related to in-
creased attention to domestic violence in the United States. Death
and injury to a fetus through violence is a major problem across the
country. The leading cause of death of pregnant women is homicide
by a domestic violence partner.5 ° Pregnancy is a key risk factor for
45. See, e.g., State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1988); State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678 (Kan.
1989); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. 1986) ("This court concludes that the legisla-
ture did not intend such a meaning [i.e., to define a fetus as a person in the murder statute] and
that if this court were to construe the statute to the contrary, it would exceed its judicial power
and deny the accused due process of law.").
46. IDAHO CODE § 18-4001 (including a fetus as a victim of murder); IDAHO CODE § 18-
4006 (including a fetus as a victim of manslaughter).
47. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (murder of a fetus); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (2004)
(feticide). Note Georgia had previously permitted fetal homicide if the fetus was quickened.
48. Cited in Rosen, supra note 25, at 40.
49. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1841 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2005).
50. VAWnet Fact Sheet: Domestic Violence and Pregnancy (Fall 2004), http://www.
vawnet.org/Domestic Violence/PublicPolicy/Children/DVPregnancy.pdf.
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victims of marital rape.5' National estimates for assaults against preg-
nant women range from 1-20%, depending upon a study's definition
of assault and the population addressed.52 In North Carolina, one
study of 1997-2000 data found up to 5.5% of all pregnant women in
the state experienced physical violence, including being pushed, hit,
slapped, and subjected to more severe acts.53 Once a child is born,
domestic violence and child abuse co-occur in 30-60% of cases.5 4
Common reasons given for violence against pregnant women are that
the male partner or father of the child feels increased stress over the
impending birth and an increased loss of control over the mother.55
Certainly these dynamics of domestic violence influenced state legisla-
tures and the federal government to increase the accountability of
abusers of pregnant women.
Although Laci and Conner's Law, also known as the federal Un-
born Victims of Violence Act, by no means is the first statute to de-
clare a fetus a person for the purpose of criminal or civil liability, it is
the first federal statute to give the fetus the full status of a crime vic-
tim, equal to that of born persons. The 2004 federal Unborn Victims
of Violence Act5 6 included both Laci and Conner's Law as well as its
military law counterpart in 10 U.S.C. § 919a.57 Their addition is con-
sistent with the trend towards enactment of state fetal homicide stat-
utes across the nation. Its federal jurisdiction provides enhanced
status to the rights of fetal homicide victims.
Thus far unchallenged in federal court, Laci and Conner's Law has
been cited in support of upholding state recognition of the fetus as a
homicide victim. In Commonwealth v. Morris,58 the Supreme Court
of Kentucky acknowledged the enactment of the federal Unborn Vic-
tims of Violence Act and the state trend to abandon the common law
born alive rule in favor of a rule that states life begins at fertilization
and conception: "For any purpose other than abortion, many jurisdic-
51. See R.K. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE: UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE OF SURVIVORS AND
SERVICE PROVIDERS (Sage, 1996).
52. L.E. Saltzman et al., Physical Abuse Around the Time of Pregnancy: An Examination of
Prevalence and Risk Factors in 16 States, 7 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 31 (2003).
53. Matt Avery, Physical Violence Against Pregnant Women in North Carolina: 1997-2000
(Statistical Brief No. 25, State Center for Health Statistics, NC Dept. of Health and Human
Services, May 2003), available at http://www.schs.state.nc.us/SCHS/pdf!SB25.pdf.
54. A.E. Appel & G.W. Holden, The Co-occurrence of Spouse and Physical Child Abuse: A
Review and Appraisal 12 J. OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY 578 (1998).
55. Pan American Health Organization, World Health Organization Fact Sheet: Domestic
Violence During Pregnancy (2004), available at http://www.paho.org/English/ad/ge/VAWpreg-
nancy.pdf
56. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1841 (West 2004).
57. M.C.L. 750.90a-f (2004). Note that the Military Code had already provided federal pen-
alties for intentional, wanton or wilful disregard for the consequences causing miscarriage, still-
birth, or aggravated physical injury to an embryo or fetus.
58. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004).
11
Brobst: The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in Nor
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2006
138 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:127
tions have abandoned viability because it has no magic sense in identi-
fying the beginning of a person's life."59
From an international perspective, the American Convention on
Human Rights is the only international human rights instrument to
contemplate the right to life from the moment of conception, rather
than from birth.6" As stated in Article 4, "Every person has the right
to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life." Most related international instruments have af-
firmatively respected a woman's right to abortion.6
In the United States, legislative efforts to overturn Roe and provide
fetuses with full constitutional rights have continued to be unsuccess-
ful. Immediately following the Roe decision in 1973, two amendments
to the Constitution were proposed that would have defined a "per-
son" to include unborn humans, both of which failed. Section 1 of the
Buckley Amendment proposed:
With respect to the right to life, the word 'person', as used in this arti-
cle and in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, applies to all human beings, including their unborn off-
spring at every stage of their biological development, irrespective of
age, health, function, or condition of dependency.62
The Buckley Amendment did contain an exception for risk of death to
the mother.63 The second proposed amendment was drafted by Rep-
resentative Jesse Helms from North Carolina and carried no excep-
tions for the life or health of the mother: "Neither the United States
nor any State shall deprive any human being from the moment of con-
ception, of life without due process of law; nor deny to any human
being, from the moment of conception, within its jurisdiction, the
equal protection of the laws."'
Thirty years later, the federal government has successfully enacted
by statute, if not by constitutional amendment, the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, which recognizes, for criminal law purposes, that a fetus
has a right to life against the violence of third parties. Yet a woman's
constitutional right to abortion in the first trimester remains intact.
In turn, state laws holding defendants accountable for crimes
against the unborn have also withstood a barrage of constitutional
challenges. For example, as a matter of first impression in Penn-
59. Id. at 669.
60. Human Rights Watch, International Human Rights Law and Abortion, at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/argentinaO6O5/7.htm (2004).
61. See Section III.
62. The Buckley Amendment, S.J. Res. 119, 93rd Cong. § 1 (1974).
63. Id. at § 2.
64. The Helms Amendment, S.J. Res. 130, 93rd Cong. (1974).
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sylvania, the Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act was held by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Bullock65 to be
constitutionally sound on a number of grounds. Matthew Bullock
confessed to the police that he had strangled his girlfriend, Lisa Har-
grave, who was then twenty-two to twenty-three weeks pregnant.66
He was found guilty, but mentally ill, of murder in the third degree of
Lisa Hargrave and guilty, but mentally ill, of voluntary manslaughter
in the death of the unborn child. He was sentenced to a twenty to sixty
year term of imprisonment.67
The first constitutional challenge in Bullock asserted that the fetal
homicide statute violated substantive due process in its vagueness and
overbreadth by using the term "unborn child," which in its definition
does not include a viability element. 68 The defendant argued the via-
bility element was necessary to ensure that the fetus was sufficiently
developed to permit the causation element to be proved. The court
reasoned that the statutory definition of the term "unborn child" as
"an individual of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live
birth" was clear, where current medical technology could define
whether the defendant's actions caused the death of the fetus, as the
medical evidence had shown in this case.69
The second challenge to the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
feticide statute also asserted overbreadth because the statute did not
define a "living" organism, and a defendant could not be held crimi-
nally liable for destruction of a non-living organism. 7 Again, the
court denied the overbreadth claim, relying on current medical tech-
nology to determine whether the fetal organism was alive; if it was not
alive, then the defendant would not be liable.71
The third constitutional challenge was based on an equal protection
claim that the statute criminalized only the actions of males, and not
similarly situated females.7" As only a pregnant woman was exempted
from liability with regards to her own unborn child, the Bullock Court
determined that a man could never be similarly situated to a pregnant
woman. In addition, the woman's constitutional right is a liberty in-
terest in her privacy, not a right to harm her unborn child; therefore,
under a rational basis analysis, and following Roe v. Wade, the Court
held "without hesitation" that the Crimes Against the Unborn Child
65. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (reviewing the Crimes
Against the Unborn Child Act, 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2601 et seq. (West 2005)).
66. Id. at 520.
67. Id. at 521.
68. Id. at 522.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 522-23.
71. Id. at 523.
72. Id. at 524.
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Act is rationally related to the government's interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life.73
Thus, a majority of jurisdictions, both state and federal, have now
successfully enacted and sustained fetal homicide laws to include the
death of the unborn child, defining the unborn child from the age of
conception or a later development stage such as a quick or viable fe-
tus. Without such statutory reform, most state courts have refused to
veer from the common law born-alive rule, as North Carolina refused
in State v. Beale.74 Of the twenty-one states that clearly include as a
victim of homicide a human being from the age of conception, at least
nine of those states have been adopted by statutes enacted since
2000. 75
Below is a current state-by-state listing of the various approaches
toward fetal homicide enactment:
76
States with fetal homicide laws where fetuses are victims from
conception
Arizona
77
Idaho78
Illinois7
9
Kentucky8°
Louisiana81
Michigan 82
Minnesota 83
73. Id. at 524-25.
74. State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989).
75. Arizona, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, West Vir-
ginia, and Texas.
76. See also, Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn
Child, 64 A.L.R.5th 671 (2006). The author was unable to conclusively determine the state of
the law as to recognition of the fetus for the purpose of homicide in the following state jurisdic-
tions: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon.
77. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-604 (2005), 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws 188.
78. 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws 330.
79. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1.2 (1993) (intentional homicide); United States ex rel. Ford
v. Ahitow, 888 F. Supp. 909 (C.D. Ill. 1995), People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. 1992)
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1024 (1995).
80. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004), overruling Hollis v. Common-
wealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507A (2004).
81. State v. Keller, 592 So. 2d 1365 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:32.7 (West 2005) (feticide); State v. Smith, 676 So. 2d 1068 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, 679 So.
2d 380 (La. 1996).
82. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 750.90 (application to pregnant victims), 28.555 (manslaughter)
(Michie 2005), 750.322 (manslaughter, quick); People v. Kurr, 253 Mich. App. Ct. 317 (2002).
83. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.21 (West 1.999) and 609.266 (West 1987); State v. Merrill, 450
N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Noble, 669 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. 2003). For an analysis of Minne-
sota's Crimes Against Unborn Children Act and judicial interpretation upholding its constitu-
14
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Mississippi84
Missouri85
Nebraska86
North Dakota
87
Ohio88
Oklahoma89
Pennsylvania9 °
South Dakota9
Utah92
Virginia 93
West Virginia 94
Wisconsin95
Texas 9
6
Wyoming 9
7
Note that the legal expansion of the definition of a homicide victim
to include the unborn fetus has generally been accomplished through
statutory reform redefining a "person" or "human being." However,
Kentucky provides the exception to the rule. In Commonwealth v.
Morris,98 the Supreme Court of Kentucky without explicit direction
by the legislature overruled decades of adherence to the common law
tionality see Michael Holzapfel, The Right to Live, the Right to Choose, and the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act, 18 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 431, 458-63 (2002).
84. 2004 Miss. Laws 521.
85. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 565.024 (West 2006) (murder and manslaughter); State v.
Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d (Mo. 1992) (Mo.
REV. STAT. 1.205.1 stating life begins at conception and unborn children have protected legal
interests applicable to involuntary manslaughter).
86. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-391 (2002) (murder), § 28-325 (2005).
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-02 (2005).
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1996); but see State v. Winston, 593 N.E.2d
308 (Ohio 1991) (viable unborn fetus is part of the mother until born); State v. Alfieri, 724
N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1998) (upheld without viability).
89. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 713 (West 1991) (manslaughter if quick); 701.7 (1998 Supp.)
(first degree murder if 24 weeks and medical testimony of viability); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d
730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (viability); McCarty v. State, 41 P.3d 981 (Okla. 2002); Birdine v.
State (2004); 2005 Okla. Sess. Laws 200 (2005 HB 1686) extends to "the unborn offspring of
human beings from the moment of conception, through pregnancy, and until live birth including
the human conceptus, morula, blastocyst, embryo and fetus.").
90. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2601-09 (1998).
91. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS CODE Ar. §1.07.
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (Supp. 1998); 2002 Utah Laws 327.
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2004).
94. W.VA. CODE § 61-2-30; 2005 W. Va. Acts 241.
95. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.75 (West 1998); State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1994).
96. Prenatal Protection Act of 2003, S.B, 319, 78th Regular Session (Tx. 2003).
97. Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1979) (prosecution for homicide of fetus and
pregnant woman not double jeopardy).
98. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 2004), overruling Hollis v. Common-
wealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
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born alive rule. The Court reasoned that medical advancements had
made obsolete the former rationales for the born alive rule, and that
increased recognition of fetal rights in other legal arenas justified the
change in the judiciary's view regarding a criminal application:
It is inherently illogical to recognize a viable fetus as a human being
whose estate can sue for wrongful death and who cannot be consensu-
ally aborted except to preserve the life or health of the mother, but
not as a human being whose life can be nonconsensually terminated
without criminal consequences. We thus overrule Hollis and hold that
a viable fetus is a 'human being' for purposes of KRS 500.080(12) and
the KRS Chapter 507 homicide statutes.99
However, nine days after the oral argument was heard in Morris, the
Kentucky General Assembly adopted House Bill 108, creating the
new offense of fetal homicide, and defining the unborn child as "a
member of the species homo sapiens in utero from conception on-
ward, without regard to age, health, or condition of dependency."'"
Thus, while the Supreme Court of Kentucky significantly expanded
fetal rights for viable fetuses, the state legislature expanded them even
more to apply to all fetuses.
States with fetal homicide laws where fetuses are victims at certain
stages of development
Arkansas' 1
California"0 2
Florida1"3
Georgia'0 4
Indiana'0 5
Iowa' 06
Maryland 10 7
99. Id. at 660.
100. Id. at 661, citing HB 108 § l(c) (2004) (codified as Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 507A (Michie
2004)).
101. ARK. CODE § 5-1-102(13).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a); People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (applying murder
of a "fetus" as defined as "beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks"), People v.
Dennis, 950 P.2d 1035 (Cal. 1994) (allows inclusion of fetal homicide in capital sentencing); Peo-
ple v. Valdez, 126 Cal. App. 4th 575, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909 (2005).
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1999).
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1996, revised in 2004) (quickening); Smith v. Newsome, 815
F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1987); Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1984); Kempson v. State, 278
Ga. 285 (2004).
105. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (murder against viable fetus); Horn v. Hendrickson, 824
N.E.2d 690 (Ind. 2005).
106. IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2004), § 707.8 (West 2005) (viable).
107. 2005 HB 398 (amending MD. ANN. CODE § 2-103) (viable).
16
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Massachusetts' 0
8
Rhode Island'019
South Carolina 10
Tennessee"'1
Washington 1 2
States Continuing to Follow the Common Law Born Alive Rule
Alabama 113
Connecticut
14
New Jersey' 15
New York' 16
Vermont1 17
Note that in the minority of states that continue to follow the common
law born alive rule for homicide, the intent of the legislature has been
an imperative focus of the courts' decisions. As the Supreme Court of
Vermont explained in State v. Oliver:
As far back as the 17th century, it was the prevailing view under the
common law that only living human beings could be the victims of
homicide. The killing of a fetus did not constitute criminal homicide
unless it was born alive and later died of injuries inflicted prior to birth
.... In light of this rule, we interpret the legislature's intent in using
the word 'person' in § 1091(c) as limiting the application of the statute
to circumstances involving the death of individuals who have already
been born." 8
States with a focus on indirect harm "resulting" to the fetus or a
focus on harm to the pregnant woman
Kansas"19
108. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v. Lawrence,
536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (viability).
109. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1994).
110. McKnight v. South Carolina, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 819
(2003) (a viable fetus is legally a person); State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); State v.
Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1998), overruled in part by State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 2000).
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-201 (2004).
112. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West Supp. 1999) (quick); Baum v. Bur-
fington, 119 Wash. App. 36 (2003).
113. Clarke v. State, 23 So. 671 (Ala. 1898).
114. State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Supp. 498 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
115. Interest of S., 440 A.2d 1174, (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980), affd by 440 A.2d 1144,
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1981).
116. People v. Hall, 158 A.D.2d 69 (1st Dep't 1990).
117. State v. Oliver, 563 A.2d 1002 (Vt. 1989) (vehicular homicide).
118. Id. at 627-628, 563 A.2d 1003 (1989).
119. State v. Trudell, 243 Kan. 29, 755 P.2d 511 (1988) (viable fetus is not a human being for
the purpose of the vehicular homicide statute); KAN STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (2005) (injury to a
pregnant woman sentencing enhancement).
17
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New Hampshire121
New Mexico1 21
North Carolina 122
Note that while New Hampshire and New Mexico enacted specific
crimes for harm to a pregnant woman, Kansas and North Carolina
chose to enact sentencing enhancements rather than separate crimes
for such harm.123
B. Civil Suits By and on Behalf of the Fetus
Although the criminal trend is of relatively recent origin, the civil
expansion of fetal rights occurred somewhat earlier. Nevertheless,
similar to the criminal assault statutes, the first legal recognition of
fetal rights in civil actions required that the fetus had rights but could
only assert them if born alive. 124 For example, since the nineteenth
century, the inheritance rights of fetuses have been recognized, as
long as the fetus is eventually born alive.'25 The history of the inheri-
tance rights of the fetus in North Carolina mirrors much of the debate
today over legally defining life and personhood. In 1853, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's decision in Dupree v. Dupree126 determined
whether a fetus six days after conception could be gifted the deed of a
slave named Rose by the fetus's great-grandmother. In denying the
fetus rights to a gift, the Court followed the common law requirement
that homicide victims be born alive: "[i]f a woman be quick with
child, and by a potion killeth it in her womb, or if a man beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, this is a great misprison, but no
murder." '127 While Justice Pearson for the majority posed the follow-
ing: "the question is, can an atom, a thing in its mother's womb, six
days old, acquire a right of property by a common law conveyance?";
the dissent of Justice Rodman replied: "It is just as capable of as-
senting as an infant just born, or an idiot, and just as capable of taking
120. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:1(I)(c) (2005) (crime of assault resulting in miscarriage or
stillbirth).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN § 30-3-7 (Michie 2005) (crime of injury to pregnant woman as a third
degree felony).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2 (2005) (sentencing enhancement for injury to a pregnant
woman causing miscarriage or stillbirth).
123. See Section IV for discussion of North Carolina's approach to fetal homicide.
124. See Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (infant recovers medical malprac-
tice damages for injuries sustained in the womb); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 495, 277 N.E.2d 20, 25 (1972) (in the year prior to Roe,
provides a thorough national comparative review of wrongful death approaches to fetal deaths).
125. See Cowles v. Cowles, 13 A. 414 (Conn. 1887); Christian v. Carter, 137 S.E. 596 (N.C.
1927).
126. Dupree v. Dupree, 45 N.C. Busb. Eq. 164, 59 Am. Dec. 590 (1853).
127. Id.
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possession of it. A guardian or friend only, in any of the cases can
protect the property.'
128
Since that time, however, North Carolina General Statute section
41-5 has expressly stated for decades that the unborn infant may take
by deed or writing.129 In applying the statute, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina asserted in 1949 that "'[b]iologically speaking, the life
of a human being begins at the moment of conception in the mother's
womb, and in the law of inheritance this view is adopted, .. .,,""o
Similarly, tort claims on behalf of fetuses harmed in the womb were
uniformly denied under common law, partly on the basis that the
cause of harm could not be determined medically at that time, which
was also a rationale for the early denial of criminal liability.131 The
separate existence of the fetus was also not generally recognized for
civil personal injury claims, where the fetus was considered a part of
the mother.132
Over a century later, the concept of guardianship proposed in the
dissent of Justice Rodman in Dupree arose in a 1981 dispute between
the mother and the State over the right to an abortion in Georgia,
where a guardian was appointed for the unborn child. The Supreme
Court of Georgia upheld the lower court's ruling that "as a matter of
fact the unborn child is a human being fully capable of sustaining life
independent of the mother and ordered the mother to undergo a cae-
sarian section without her consent., 133
A majority of jurisdictions today permit recovery for the wrongful
death of a fetus. 1 34  North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act under
N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-2 has been interpreted to include claims on behalf
of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.135 The distinction of viability was
addressed because the wrongful death statute indicates the death of a
"person," which the North Carolina Supreme Court in DiDonato v.
128. Id.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5 (2005).
130. Mackie v. Mackie, 52 S.E.2d 352, 354 (N.C. 1949); see also Campbell v. Everhart, 52 S.E.
201 (N.C. 1905).
131. See Stanford v. St. Louis - San Francisco Ry. Co., 108 So. 566 (1926).
132. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
133. Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding City Hospital, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). Note that the
mother was never actually forced to undergo the caesarian section. She gave birth safely and
vaginally before the decision was finally rendered. Rosen, supra, note 25, at 29.
134. For an analysis of the history of the wrongful death statutes and recognition of a fetus as
a person in North Carolina, see Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing - In Search of the Legal Status of
a Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169 (1995).
135. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., 365 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (physician's failure to treat mother's diabetes caused fetus to die in utero of malnutri-
tion); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987). But see Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337
S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied 479 U.S. 835 (1986) (North Carolina does not recognize a
wrongful life or wrongful birth claim with respect to medical negligence for failure to inform
parents that fetus had Down's Syndrome).
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Wortman determined in 1987 must be someone who possesses "human
life":
A viable fetus, whatever its legal status might be, is undeniably alive
and undeniably human. It is, by definition, capable of life indepen-
dent of its mother. A viable fetus is genetically complete and can be
taxonomically distinguished from non-human life forms. 136
This rationale has been asserted by state courts for decades. As early
as 1971, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals asserted that a
fetus is a person for the purpose of the wrongful death statute "in view
of the fact that 'biologically speaking' such a child is, in fact, a pres-
ently existing person, a living human being. 13 7 Yet even in those
States that deny recovery for fetal wrongful death, the decisions have
not argued that the fetus cannot be a person under the law, but that
the common law and statutory law have not granted the Courts au-
thority to define the fetus as a person.138 This again leaves the door
open to increased fetal rights through legislative reform.
In federal benefits cases, the greater focus on parental rights is less
clear. The fetus has been recognized at times and not at others
through the vagaries of statutory reform. For the purpose of AFDC
benefits, the fetus was originally included in the definition of a needy
dependent as one under the age of 21, until the United States Su-
preme Court in 1975 held that States were not required to interpret
the statute in this way. 139 By 1985, eligibility for AFDC benefits and
prenatal care was primarily determined by focusing on the needs of
the pregnant mother, rather than identifying the fetus as a dependent
in need of care.'4 °
Civil recognition of fetal rights may have had a longer and more
varied history than recognition in criminal law, as seen in the review
of inheritance, wrongful death, and inheritance actions. Nevertheless,
the recognition of fetal personhood in civil statutes should not neces-
sarily influence the trend toward a similar recognition in criminal ac-
tions. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Dickerson expressly
refused to apply the civil definition of a person to a criminal statute,
even though the civil wrongful death statute would have allowed re-
136. DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 491; cf. Stetson v. Easterling, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968) (claim for
wrongful death of viable fetus upheld).
137. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 432 (W. Va. 1971).
138. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977) (use of the word "person" indi-
cates legislative intent to exclude fetuses as wrongful death victims).
139. Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1976)).
140. See Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1211 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1992); Lewis v. Thompson, 252
F.3d 567 (2d Cir. N.Y. (2001) (States can deny prenatal care to undocumented illegal resident
mothers).
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covery for the death of the fetus."' "It is one thing to mold, change
and even reverse established principles of common law and civil mat-
ters. It is quite another thing to do so in regard to criminal stat-
utes., 142  Today, state crimes are generally matters of statutory
enactment within a comprehensive criminal justice scheme to ensure
fairness, equity, and accountability for criminal intent and harm. As a
result, most state courts require clear legislative intent to expand in-
terpretation of criminal statutes, including an expansion of the defini-
tion of a crime victim to include the unborn. While expanded fetal
rights in a civil context may color the fetal homicide debate, ultimately
most states have required legislative reform to expand the rights of
fetal crime victims.
C. Child Endangerment Actions for Risk to the Fetus
As a hybrid of both civil and criminal approaches to fetal harm,
child endangerment laws are more likely to impact the growth of fetal
homicide statutes. Statutory child abuse and neglect statutes have his-
torically not included unborn children. However, in line with the gen-
eral trend toward (1) increased protections of the fetus and the child,
(2) heightened duties of care required by parents, and (3) increased
State intervention on behalf of child rights, state legislatures have be-
gun to reform their civil and criminal statutes to include risks to the
fetus as a form of child abuse and neglect.'43 Much of this shift to
expand the duties of parents to the unborn has occurred within the
last five years.
As early as 1981, the New Jersey legislature specifically included the
fetus as a child protected from neglect.'4 4 Two decades later in South
Carolina, Regina McKnight received a twelve-year active prison sen-
tence in 2003 for smoking crack cocaine resulting in the birth of a still-
born child.' 45 The court applied a 1992 statute for child abuse and
neglect to a child younger than 11 "under circumstances manifesting
an extreme indifference to human life.' '1 4 6
141. State v. Dickerson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); see also People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775
(1980) (refusing to permit application of a wrongful death definition of a fetus as a person to a
criminal statute); contra Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 2004), as discussed
above.
142. Dickerson at 28 Ohio S.2d 65, 70, 275 N.E.2d 599.
143. For a thorough analysis of child endangerment laws applied to pregnant women, see
Cheryl E. Amana, Drugs, AIDS and Reproductive Choice: Maternal-State Conflict Continues
into the Millennium, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 32 (2005). See also, Robert D. Goldstein, Is There Juris-
diction Over A Fetus?, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND MATERIALS 302-321 (West
1999).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:4C-11 (West 1981).
145. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 819 (2003).
146. Id. at 176.
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In contrast, in 2001 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed the child neglect conviction of a pregnant woman who was
found in a methamphetamine laboratory trailer.1 47 The defendant
mother had tested negative for narcotics and eventually gave birth to
a healthy son. In Ferguson v. Charleston, the United States Supreme
Court held that a hospital policy to collect evidence of drug use from
all pregnant women's bodies for possible criminal prosecution vio-
lated the mothers' Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy as a patient in medical setting.
148
In child endangerment actions by the State, the balance between
State, maternal, and fetal rights during pregnancy is precarious. No
clear trends towards affirmation of maternal rights exists as it does in
fetal homicide excepts for lawful abortion. The reality is that a
mother may be prosecuted for negligently harming her unborn child,
yet she is immune from prosecution for killing the unborn child in a
lawful abortion. This is where the future legal debate on fetal and
maternal rights will likely come to a head in the near future. Any
consideration of fetal homicide reform must consider the impact on
women's rights and fetal rights for actions that cause both lethal and
non-lethal harm to the fetus.
In 2004, the Court of Appeal of California upheld the termination
of parental rights of both parents of a boy, Travis, who had been ex-
posed to multiple forms of abuse, including substance abuse by both
parents. 149  One factor cited was that Travis's premature birth was
due to the mother's poor prenatal care and a "hostile environment"
created by both the mother and the father of the fetus.15 While this
may seem a reasonable approach to many, the pendulum for child en-
dangerment may swing much farther. In 2004, Utah became the first
State to press homicide charges against a mother who had refused to
undergo a cesarean section, causing the stillborn death of one of her
two twin fetuses. 151
Most failure to protect charges involve drug use and failure to seek
adequate health care during pregnancy. Fetal homicide bills, how-
ever, invoke a fear among domestic violence victim advocates that
failure to protect charges will not only address a mother's unjustifiable
negligent prenatal care, but her fully justifiable failure to protect the
147. In re Unborn Child of Starks, 18 P.3d 342 (Okla. 2001).
148. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
149. In re Travis. C., No. A103237, 2004 WL 670928, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. April 1, 2004).
150. Id. at *1.
151. See Monica K. Miller, Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Section: A Woman's Right or a
Criminal Act?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 383 (2005) (The mother pled guilty to a child endangerment
charge).
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fetus from domestic violence as well.152 Even women who receive
threats to kill by the abuser or are severely harmed when they try to
leave are already subject to increased scrutiny by the courts when
their born children are also at risk. 5 3
A major concern of the child endangerment approach to a pregnant
woman who fails to adequately care for her growing fetus is that it
increases punishment of mothers who essentially need help. The
moral conflict cannot be ignored when a State increases punitive mea-
sures against pregnant mothers who do not seek help, in part because
the State fails to make available sufficient treatment options. "De-
spite the fact that drug treatment programs tailored for pregnant and
parenting women help them overcome their addiction problems,
greatly improve birth outcomes, and are cost-effective, such programs
are extremely rare and overburdened." '154
D. The Limited Scope of Fetal Rights in Abortion Law
The pattern of expansion of human rights has included increased
rights generally for a diversity of adults, as well as the rights of born
children and now unborn children. Historically in the United States,
many classes of born persons have been denied the status of "person"
under the law, a matter of national shame for us today. For example,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia asserted in 1858:
[Slo far ... as civil rights and relations are concerned, the slave is not a
person, but a thing. The investiture of a chattel with civil rights or
legal capacity is indeed a legal solecism and absurdity. The attribution
of legal personality to a chattel slave ... implies a palpable contradic-
tion in terms.'55
However, in the 150 years since this decision, the trend towards
greater civil rights under the law has been one of consistent inclusion,
on the basis of race, gender, class, property ownership, sexual orienta-
tion, and age. Where constitutional law continues to distinguish be-
tween full "personhood" of citizens and "personhood" to a lesser or
limited degree, is among the classes of persons deemed "incompe-
tent": minors and persons with cognitive disabilities, whether genetic
152. North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence, NCCADV Position Statement.
Fetal Murder Legislation (2006) ("The domestic violence community is concerned that this legis-
lation is one step closer to the possibility that a pregnant victim of domestic violence could be
held responsible for the death of her child because she did not 'protect' her unborn child from a
batterer.").
153. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 F.App'x. 313 (2d Cir. 2004) (preventing State over-
reaching in addressing children exposed to domestic violence).
154. Center for Reproductive Rights Briefing Paper, Punishing Women for Their Behavior
During Pregnancy: An Approach That Undermines Women's Health and Children's Interests, 7
(Sept. 2000), at http://reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub-bp-punishingwomen.pdf.
155. Bailey v. Poindexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858).
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or acquired through age or injury. The rationales underlying the dis-
tinctions are varied and complicated. We see in fetal homicide
charges, civil suits and child endangerment actions a trend towards
both increased recognition of fetal rights and increased recognition of
the duties and rights of the parents of the fetus.
Roe constitutionally protected a woman's right to privacy in her un-
limited choice to abort a fetus in the first trimester of its being, follow-
ing the historical emphasis on the "quickened" fetus as a person.
Although the nature of a woman's abortion right will be discussed in
greater depth in Section III below, the United States Supreme Court's
view of fetal rights since Roe has displayed an increasing willingness to
define certain rights in the fetus from conception.1
56
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court did not expressly state that the
fetus had individual constitutional rights; rather, as Justice Blackmun
argued for the majority, the State held a legitimate interest in protect-
ing the "potentiality" of life among its citizenry.157 The Court also
held that its prior decisions had not given a fetus the status of full
constitutional "personhood" as it did born humans, providing that
"the unborn have never been recognized in law as persons in the
whole sense." '158 Nevertheless, the combination of the "potentiality"
language and the silence over whether partial "personhood" could be
recognized, and has left open the door for argument as to whether a
fetus holds at least limited human rights under the Constitution.
Indeed, in the following decade in the 5-4 decision of Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a Missouri law that defined "human life" as beginning at concep-
tion in order to restrict access and the right to an abortion.1 59 The
Court continued to uphold Roe, but declared "we do not see why the
State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into
existence only at the point of viability."' 60 Thus, States took this to
mean that they were granted leave to pass additional restrictive laws
upon abortion, as long as the basic rights to abortion expressed in Roe
were upheld.161 Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing in his dissent in
Webster that "a woman's constitutionally protected liberty encom-
passes the right to act on her own belief that ...until a seed has
acquired the powers of sensation and movement, the life of a human
156. Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
158. Id.
159. Webster, 492 U.S. at 494.
160. Id. at 519.
161. EDD DOERR & JAMES W. PRESCOTr, ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL 'PERSONHOOD'
viii (2d ed. 1990).
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being has not yet begun.' 162 Nonetheless, no majority decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court has since taken the position that Justice Stevens
asserted: that even in its early stages a fetus is not a human being.
Subsequent state decisions have interpreted Roe and Webster to per-
mit granting rights and criminal justice protections to fetuses from
conception as long as the basic right to abortion is a lawful exception
to harming the fetus.163 As the Minnesota Supreme Court asserted in
State v. Merrick: "Roe v. Wade... does not protect, much less confer
on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus. 1 6 4
As discussed in Part II(C), a greater infringement on Roe has oc-
curred in child endangerment actions by the State against pregnant
mothers.
Nevertheless, the right to abortion is only one of several related
rights of potential parents. For example, the constitutional right to
privacy includes the right to refuse to create new life. Across the na-
tion, adults and minors, both male and female, may confidentially ob-
tain contraception by choice.165 Here is the American limit to the
legal protections for the "potentiality" of life. While eggs and sperm
are respectively present and alive in the female and male human bod-
ies, obviously essential to the "potentiality" of life, no state has at-
tempted to deny childbearing human beings the right of access to
contraception since the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right to con-
traception in marriage in 1965.166
Therefore, the potential parts of a fetus prior to conception wholly
lack constitutional protection. Coupled with Roe's focus on the devel-
opment and viability of the fetus limiting a pregnant woman's right to
privacy, jurisprudence for the past several decades has deemed con-
ception essential to the establishment of personhood with correspond-
ing constitutional rights. This outer limit to legal personhood implies
the creation of personhood at conception, whether one argues that it
is a partial or increasing personhood until viability or birth, or that it is
full personhood at conception.
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to affirmatively state when
life or viability begins:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
162. Webster, 492 U.S. at 572.
163. See supra Section II(A) (discussing Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005)).
164. State v. Merrill, 450 N.w.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
165. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
166. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
2006]
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point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.167
It is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place
viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in
the gestational period. The time when viability is achieved may vary
with each pregnancy. 168
Because of the number and the imprecision of these variables, the
probability of any particular fetus' obtaining meaningful life outside
the womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the re-
cord indicates that even if agreement may be reached on the
probability of survival, different physicians equate viability with differ-
ent probabilities of survival, and some physicians refuse to equate via-
bility with any numerical probability at all.' 6 9
Nevertheless, Roe set the first trimester as the benchmark for the
"compelling point" of viability. As the Court explained:
This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb .... If the State is inter-
ested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to pro-
scribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother. 70
Thereafter, the State's protection of fetal rights generally supersedes
maternal rights, regardless of the fact that her body carries the unborn
child.
Prior to Roe, nineteenth century criminal abortion statutes had also
looked to the developmental stage of the fetus. However, the trend to
use the term "quickening" as the benchmark in criminal anti-abortion
statutes declined steadily throughout the nation. North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes section 14-44 enacted in 1881 was the last such statute in
the United States to include the term.17 1 This North Carolina statute
continues to this day to criminalize the unlawful abortion of a "quick-
ened" fetus as a Class H felony.17 2 Nevertheless, Roe permanently
altered the landscape of abortion rights. Pursuant to Roe, lawful abor-
tions may be obtained in North Carolina until the point of viability
that is designated as 20 weeks. 173 For states such as Indiana, which
have chosen not to have a "bright-line trimester-based presumption of
viability," if the medical physician fails to adequately record viability,
then any relevant party may file an injunction to prevent the mother
167. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
168. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976).
169. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979).
170. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
171. Mark S. Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe At-
tempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & POLY REV. 199, 259 (1996).
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (2006).
173. Id. § 14-5.1.
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from exercising her right to terminate the pregnancy.174 Viability is
presumed.
It must be recognized, however, that any definition of constitutional
personhood, including the point of its inception and termination, is a
legal fiction created by legislators and judges according to their assess-
ment of precedent, moral ethics and the wishes of a democratic adult
populace. If moral ethics under the law require justification for the
lawful killing of a person or even a non-human sentient being such as
an animal, then the possible justifications for the killing of fetuses
must be examined with great care in as much depth as possible.
In recent years the trend towards increased fetal rights has relied
more on medical advances than moral ethics. However, scientific def-
initions of personhood are also matters of fiction and human con-
struct, however ordered and logical they may be. For example, while
neuroscientist Michael Bennett asserts that "[p]ersonhood develops
well after birth in a gradual process and requires changes in this neu-
ral equipment, mainly in the connections between neurons," '175 he also
acknowledges that the lack of personhood in a young developing in-
fant does not justify infanticide, where empathy, and societal and pa-
rental interests in the welfare of the infant outweigh any possible
interest in killing the infant.176 In the legal debate over fetal rights,
science inherently merges with culture. Anthropologists for decades
have described the cultural rationales of societies that permit infanti-
cide on the basis that newborns and young infants are deemed non-
human until a certain developmental stage.177 Of course, the United
States government and its history of British common law have never
subscribed to this view, but it has been a matter of cultural choice as
to whether a fetus is in fact human and worthy of human rights.
Today, in most jurisdictions, a fetus has certain limited civil and
criminal rights in certain circumstances. If a change in this trend were
to allow a fetus full rights of personhood, whether by constitutional
reform or interpretation, the impact on society would be unimagin-
able. Yet, the prospect of an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in
174. See S.H. v. D.H., 796 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
175. Michael V.L. Bennett, Personhood From a Neuroscientific Perspective in ABORTION
RIGHTS AND FETAL 'PERSONHOOD' 77-79 (2d ed. 1990).
176. Id. at 78.
177. See generally, Lynn M. Morgan, When Does Life Begin? A Cross-Cultural Perspective
on the Personhood of Fetuses and Young Children, in ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL 'PER-
SONHOOD' 89 (2d ed, 1990). See also, Glenn Hausfater, Infanticide: Comparative and Evolution-
ary Perspectives, 25(4) CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 500, 501 (1984) (listing cross-cultural
comparisons of the following types of offspring at greatest risk of infanticide: "if they are (1)
deformed, (2) illegitimate, (3) born too close in time to a sibling, or (4) of the wrong sex in a
society which values the labor of males and females differentially.").
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North Carolina requires consideration of the specter of such a poten-
tial future in order to better guide any current efforts at reform.
III. JUSTIFYING ABORTION IN THE CHILD RIGHTS ERA
The current fetal homicide statutory reform movement has arisen
since the 1970s at the height of the Child Rights Movement, the Abor-
tion Rights Movement, and the Domestic Violence Movement. In-
deed, scholarship has begun to pair the Fetal Rights Movement with
that of the already existing Child Rights Movement. According to
one recent anti-abortion view: "True recognition of the civil rights of
children will not meaningfully progress until America learns to value
children at all stages of development.' 178
The increased recognition of child rights has been dramatic, as seen
in the 1989 International Convention on the Rights of the Child. 7 9
The United States Supreme Court cited the Convention in its six-to-
three decision in Roper v. Simmons in 2005, recognizing with disap-
proval that only the United States and Somalia have failed to sign the
Convention. 80 Roper was the first United States Supreme Court de-
cision prohibiting capital punishment for minors under 18. Even the
dissents of Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor in Roper recognize
that youth deserve special consideration and protection, providing
that the status of youth itself should be a mitigating circumstance in
sentencing.181
Most fetal homicide cases have described horrific domestic violence
homicides of pregnant women such as Laci Peterson. We have also
seen numerous major statutory reforms nationally and internationally
concerned with family violence and the rights of the vulnerable. The
Violence Against Women Act was recently reauthorized granting fed-
eral protections to adults and children against domestic violence, sex-
ual assault and child abuse.'82
Roe created a balancing test, recognizing the State's legitimate in-
terest in protecting the "potentiality of human life" as well as the life
and health of the mother.1 83 Yet at no point in Roe is the fetus con-
sidered non-human. Essentially, in a single decision, Roe embodies
178. Tracy Leigh Dodds, Note, Defending America's Children: How the Current System Gets
It Wrong, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 719, 719 (2006).
179. International Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
1448, 1468-1470.
180. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
181. Id. at 588, 621 (J. Scalia writes "juries take seriously their responsibility to weigh youth
as a mitigating factor").
182. The Violence Against Women Act originated in 1994 (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261 et seq.), was
reauthorized by the Violence Against Women Act 2000, and most recently reauthorized by the
Violence Against Women Act 2005 (Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960).
183. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
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much of the balancing required in the conflux of these various human
rights movements. However, for the purpose of determining the con-
stitutional rights, if any, of the fetus, the Court made the choice to
define the fetus as a legal "person" who could be unduly deprived of
life, liberty or property under the U.S. Constitution only after birth.
Under Roe, the increasing legal protections given the fetus as it devel-
ops and becomes viable in the womb are expressed as a State interest
in the potentiality of life, not as recognition of the child as a full or
partial legal person with individual constitutional rights.
If Roe had not protected women's liberty interests in this way, one
concern is that "Itlo deprive women their right to control their actions
during pregnancy is to deprive women of their legal personhood."'1
Indeed, according to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts following
the Roe v. Wade decision,
[t]he constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression
of the sanctity of individual free choice, and self determination as fun-
damental constituents of life. The value of life ... is lessened ... b
the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice. 181
How then is the balance to be maintained? Again, this is a required
consideration for any effort to enact an Unborn Victims of Violence
Act, for aside from the fetal interest, a pregnant mother's interest will
be of greatest importance. A review of some of the rationales justify-
ing abortion bears notice.
A. Human Population Control
The United States does not face severe population problems today.
However, what is strangely not discussed in the abortion debate is the
obvious reality that a severe population problem would clearly occur
if abortion were uniformly prohibited. In 1953, Alfred Kinsey's re-
search determined that approximately 90% of premarital pregnancies
ended in abortion and that 22% of married women had obtained an
abortion, despite the fact that abortion was illegal at the time. 86 Cur-
rently, about one in three American women will have had an abortion
by the age of 45.187 In North Carolina in 2003, 26,708 abortions were
184. Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitu-
tional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 620 (1986).
185. Superintendent of Belcherton State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
186. ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, No TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE
FumRE OF WOMEN 236 (Ist ed. 2002).
187. Guttmacher Institute, State Facts About Abortion: North Carolina (2006) at www.
guttmacher.org.
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performed in the state.188 Approximately 19% of North Carolina
pregnancies result in abortion each year.189
Thus, even if eventually the tide of fetal rights were to actually re-
duce or eliminate a woman's right to an abortion, no plan is proffered
by right to life scholars as to how the State would alleviate the ex-
pected additional burden on women, their children, their families, and
the State itself. Departments of Social Services throughout the coun-
try struggle with inadequate resources to address already existing pov-
erty, neglect and abuse. Even if the burdens of desperate women
unable to care for additional children were not taken into account, a
rendering of the social fabric of the United States would occur where
the impact of these additional children would deeply impact the lives
of born persons, and specifically the poverty rates among women and
children. With the stress of poverty partly associated with family vio-
lence, ironically an end to abortion would likely increase domestic vio-
lence, child abuse, and spousal and fetal homicide.
Nevertheless, abortion rights are also human rights matters that re-
quire great care. If the United States were to recognize population
control concerns as a justification for permitting abortion, then the
role of the State in deciding whose population should be controlled
has unacceptable potential for undermining many of the human rights
we have achieved. For example, between 1936 and 1976 Sweden forci-
bly sterilized over sixty thousand people, "most of them women con-
sidered [by the State] to be racially or socially inferior."' 19 China's
1979 one child per family campaign was implemented for the purpose
of population control; state financial and housing benefits for families
that complied brought about voluntary use of state funded contracep-
tion, abortion, and sterilization.' 9 ' In 1995 China was compelled to
enact legal measures to prevent abortion on the basis of the gender of
the fetus, in a society where sons had greater social status than daugh-
ters.192  The anthropological selective factors noted previously re-
garding infanticide appear naturally in the right to abortion, whether
culturally Western or First World or not.
Modem scientific advances have already touched on the State's bur-
den in unexpected ways. Since the 1980s there has been open discus-
sion about the ethics of discarding unneeded fertilized eggs in the in
188. Tania Malik, NARAL Pro-Choice North Carolina, Sex and Reproduction: At What
Point May Privacy be Set Aside?, N.C. Bar Association CLE (Jan. 14, 2005). According to the
report, the majority of cases involve ethnic minority women over the age of 20 who already have
had at least one child but who have never had an abortion before.
189. Guttmacher Institute, State Facts About Abortion: North Carolina (2006) at www.
guttmacher.org.
190. Freedman, supra note 186, at 233.
191. Id. at 245.
192. Id. at 246.
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vitro fertilization process and its impact on the abortion debate. 193
The process of in vitro fertilization requires the abandonment of a
number of fertilized eggs once the mother is successfully impregnated
with one of them.' 94 If the killing of these unborn "children" was not
justified under the law, would the State be able to ensure their sur-
vival and well being through birth, childhood and life? There are ap-
proximately 400,000 human embryos, "each the size of the head of a
pin," stored in cylinders in over 430 fertility clinics across the coun-
try.195 To deny parents the right to this form of pregnancy assistance
on the basis of the ethical problem of destroying the fertilized eggs
would also prevent the life of the one child successfully born through
the process. Hence, it pits fetal rights against fetal rights. Any uni-
form abortion prohibition would inherently impact fertilization assis-
tance technology and availability.
In 2005, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that parents of five
negligently destroyed frozen pre-embryos, which had progressed from
zygote to 8-celled organisms, did not have a claim for wrongful death
because the statutory definition of a "person" did not include "con-
ception outside a woman's womb."' 96 While the decision hinged on
legislative intent, as with many fetal rights legal decisions it invited
public and legislative debate regarding recognition of parental and fe-
tal rights for the 400,000 human embryos currently existing in our so-
ciety. While domestic violence cases such as that of Laci Peterson
invoke a natural empathetic response to the loss of the unborn, the
ripple effect of fetal rights legislation reaches far beyond the legal wa-
ters of the criminal justice system.
B. The Undue Burden of an Unwanted Pregnancy
Justifying abortion based on the special burden placed on women as
unique childbearers remains the primary basis for maintaining a con-
stitutional right to privacy in abortion decisions. In writing for the
majority in Roe, Justice Blackmun described the importance of a wo-
man's right of privacy with regard to abortion:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
193. See Janet Gallagher, "Eggs, Embryos, Foetuses: Anxiety and the Law," in REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 139, 147 (Michelle Stamworth
ed. 1987).
194. For a discussion of scientific advances in pregnancy and the abortion debate, see
Michael V.L. Bennett, "Personhood From a Neuroscientific Perspective," in ABORTION RIGHTS
AND FETAL 'PERSONHOOD' 77, 78 (Edd Doerr & James W. Prescott eds., 2d ed., 1990).
195. Bob Smietana, When Does Personhood Begin? And What Difference Does it Make?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 2004, at 24.
196. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
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Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the dis-
tress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psycho-
logically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved.' 97
Prior to Roe, this burden on women was also acknowledged. In ad-
dressing Indiana's right to abortion, Justice DeBruler in his dissent
argued:
[A] pregnant woman denied an abortion by this law, must run the risk
of dying when that risk is not a certainty, but only a middle range
probability. Once pregnant, she is mandated in service of the State to
hazard the risks of pregnancy and delivery, no matter what the degree
of risk to her own health might be, and even though she may be invol-
untarily pregnant as the result of a rape. And after assigning her these
burdens, this statute gives no form or degree of remedy or recognition
to her person, her suffering, or any of her needs, be they physical,
mental or even financial. 198
Since Roe, much of the undue burden language of the Supreme
Court decisions relating to abortion addressed the undue burden of
restrictions on the right to an abortion, such as parental notifica-
tion,199 pro life counseling,"° and a husband's consent.20 ' However,
in upholding the right to abortion, the Court has also addressed the
burdens placed on women facing an unwanted pregnancy. This ratio-
nale of an "undue burden" on the mother is one of the most important
justifications that the Court has invoked. The burden on the pregnant
woman should she be forced to conceive and/or forced to give birth is
a burden not only on herself, but on the father, her other children, and
the State.
The dissent of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services clearly delineates the justification for
abortion rights based on the hardship to women:
The plurality would clear the way once again for government to force
upon women the physical labor and specific and direct medical and
psychological harms that may accompany them carrying a fetus to
term. The plurality would clear the way again for the State to con-
197. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
198. Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. 1972).
199. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990).
200. See Thornburgh v. the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-
769 (1986).
201. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976); and Planned
Parenthood Assoc. of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
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script a woman's body and to force upon her a 'distressful life and
future'."202
Note that Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe's majority decision,
did not emphasize the inherent rights or power of women to make the
choice to abort, nor did he argue that the fetus lacked all rights, but
instead, the Justice emphasized the justification to abort due to the
hardship and undue burden upon women who do not wish to give
birth or care for an additional child.
One must also keep in mind that for the greater part of history the
burden on women to bear children has existed whether they have con-
sented to the sexual act or not. Having the legal right to force sex
upon a wife essentially made legal a husband's right to force preg-
nancy upon her. Only as recently as 1993 did North Carolina com-
pletely abolish the marital rape exemption, which had allowed a
husband to force sexual intercourse upon his wife regardless of the
degree of force or presence of injury.20 3 Many states continue to grant
some degree of exemption to husbands for marital sex crimes. Marital
rape victims report greater long-term effects of trauma than victims of
any other kind of rape or domestic violence because of the personal
betrayal and often repeated sexual and physical violence against
them.20 4 Should a forced pregnancy result, the burden and trauma
upon the mother may be psychologically unbearable.
Mental health conditions, addictions, fear of poverty, and other fac-
tors may account for the neglect of the mother toward her unborn
child. The role of domestic violence in child endangerment cases must
also be taken into account. Domestic violence against pregnant wo-
men occurs in up to 20% of cases.20 5 Aside from the physical injury to
the mother and fetus addressed by criminal statutes, the violence can
severely impact the psychological health of the mother. Abused preg-
nant women have a higher risk of conditions of depression, stress, and
addiction to tobacco, alcohol and drugs.20 6 The resulting depression
202. Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989).
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1993).
204. See generally, DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE
OF WIVES (1985); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (Indiana Univ. Press, 1982); RA-
QUEL KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE: UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE OF SURVIVORS AND
SERVICE PROVIDERS (Sage Series on Violence Against Women, Vol. 2, 1996); and Jennifer A.
Bennice et al., The Relative Effects of Intimate Partner Physical and Sexual Violence on Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptomatology, VIOLENCE & VICTIMS, Feb. 2003, 87.
205. Linda E. Saltzman et al., Physical Abuse Around the Time of Pregnancy: An Examina-
tion of Prevalence and Risk Factors in 16 States, MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J., March 2003, at
38.
206. E.H. Newberger & S.E. Barkan, Abuse of Pregnant Women and Adverse Birth Out-
come, J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS'N 2370 (1992).
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can lead to a general loss of interest in the baby's health and welfare
during the pregnancy and after the child is born. °7
Yet, if the fetus were given full personhood status, the social and
physical stresses upon the mother would not legally justify her failure
to act on behalf of the fetus and its welfare. Duress must be much
more direct to provide a justification defense than mere depression
from abuse or poverty. Not only does the State fail to adequately
support women under these circumstances, it now exacerbates their
burdens through the punitive measures of child endangerment
actions.2 08
Based on the social and physical reality of the special risks and bur-
dens for women as child bearers, what is required is greater judicial
and social recognition of these risks and burdens, as well as increased
public memory prior to Roe of the social impact on the United States
when abortion was prohibited. In nations that currently deny women
the right to abortion, the devastating consequences mirror those that
the United States experienced prior to Roe v. Wade. In Argentina, for
example, Human Rights Watch has documented the denial of access
to contraception and abortion as a human rights violation. According
to Argentina's Health Ministry, 40% of all pregnancies are terminated
through illegal abortions, up to half a million abortions a year. 0 9
Moreover, illegal abortion has been the leading cause of death of
pregnant women in Argentina for decades.2 1
Only when the government can adequately fund the prenatal care
of mother and fetus and the future care of impoverished mothers and
their born children, only then will the undue burden on the mother be
diminished as a justification for abortion.
C. The Risk of Injury, Death or Severe Disability
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has permitted restrictions on the
right to abortion, it has consistently upheld the right to abortion at all
stages of pregnancy when the health or life of the mother is at risk.211
In the balance between the mother's interests and that of the "potenti-
ality of life" within her, the mother's interest in life outweighs the fetal
interest in life. The Model Penal Code in 1962 used justification lan-
guage in promoting legal abortion, with its first justification listing
health risks to mothers:
207. Id.
208. See Section II(C).
209. Human Rights Watch, Decisions Denied: Women's Access to Contraceptives and Abor-
tion in Argentina (2004), at http://hrw.org/women/argentina.
210. Id.
211. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
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(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminat-
ing a pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health
of the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or
mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or
other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below the
age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for purposes of this Subsection.
Justifiable abortions shall be performed only in a licensed hospital ex-
cept in case of emergency when hospital facilities are unavailable.2 12
Early complete prohibitions of abortion were often justified on the
basis that the abortions themselves were generally unsafe for the
mother. By 1972, just prior to Roe, state courts began to note that "an
abortion, under proper medical care, during the early months of preg-
nancy is now safer than childbirth. ' 2 13 The comparative risks of abor-
tion and childbirth were addressed in a March 1989 public hearing on
a report from the House Committee on Government Operations enti-
tled "The Federal Role in Determining the Medical and Psychological
Impact of Abortion on Women." In this report, the availability of
abortion was found to have a positive health impact on women, but
only if done early:
Carrying a pregnancy to term is 7 to 25 times more likely to result in
the death of the woman than a first trimester abortion .... [T]he U.S.
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) showed that abortion generally
does not affect subsequent fertility .... [The] CDC reported that the
risk of death to the pregnant woman obtaining an abortion doubles for
every two weeks' delay after eight weeks of gestation .... 214
As to the mental health impact of abortion, the American Psycho-
logical Association report discussed at the 1989 hearing concluded
"despite the flaws in the research, there is so little evidence of psychi-
atric problems following abortion, and so much evidence of relief, that
therefore abortion does not cause more psychiatric problems than un-
wanted pregnancy. "215
In earlier decisions, the justifications for rape and incest were likely
founded on moral grounds. However, today with a greater under-
standing of the substantial mental health trauma caused by rape, the
justification of gravely impairing the mental health of the mother
could potentially encompass acts of rape as well. Justifying abortion
of children born with grave "defects" is a more difficult issue, where
the constitutional rights of persons with disabilities deemed legally in-
competent are firmly protected, despite their more limited nature. In
212. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, § 230.3 Abortion (1962).
213. Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. 1972).
214. Bennett, supra note 175, at xi-xii, citing Rep. 101-392, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
215. Id. at xii.
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North Carolina, discovery of severe defects is not grounds for a late-
term lawful abortion.216
As long as the government refuses to adequately research and fund
birth control, provide public education on its use, and equitably ad-
dress the social hardships on a mother in bearing primary legal and
social responsibility for the children born to her, it has no choice but
to recognize the unequal and significant burdens on women as a justi-
fication for upholding a right to abortion. The State's repeated inter-
est in the fetal rights debate has been in the continued welfare of its
citizenry as a whole, including mothers, fathers, and their born chil-
dren. Part of the desperation of mothers who unsafely abort their fe-
tuses when such options are illegal is due to their understanding that
the State is unwilling and unable to adequately assist them in the care
of their born children, something many single mothers in poverty ex-
perience today on a daily basis.
The emergence of fetal homicide statutes brings to light how impor-
tant the right to abortion is, particularly for women facing unexpected
and abhorrent forced sexual encounters and domestic violence, who
then bear the brunt of responsibility for unwanted pregnancies. Real-
istically, American society cannot possibly take over this burden for
the vast numbers of children potentially added to the welfare rolls
each year if abortion were prohibited. The burden on women far out-
weighs the rights of the fetus at the earliest stages, rights which do
exist but are much more limited than that of any born persons.
Nevertheless, respecting the pregnant woman's choice to abort in-
herently implies respecting her choice to keep the child and experi-
ence motherhood. The violence that fetal homicide laws address not
only perpetrates a wrong against the unborn child with its more lim-
ited legal rights, but also takes away the pregnant woman's choice to
become a mother, which is her full legal right.217 For most parents,
the loss of a child is unbearable whether the child is born or nearly
born. As the Indiana Court of Appeals acknowledged in 2005 when
permitting wrongful death damages to parents whose Niable unborn
child was killed in an automobile accident:
[T]he fact that the child was born alive, which allowed the parents to
touch and see the child prior to its death, is a valid consideration for
the jury in awarding damages. But it is not uncommon for the parents
of a stillborn fetus to hold their child, and like the parents of a child
born alive, parents of an unborn viable fetus have been damaged by
216. 48 N.C. Att'y Gen. 136 (1979) (to Mr. Lewis H. Nelson, M.D., Assistant Professor,
Bowman Gray School of Medicine).
217. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (liberty is a basic civil
right, fundamental to the existence and survival of the race, and includes the right to marry and
to procreate).
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the loss of their progeny whose love and affection they would have
enjoyed, but for the intervening wrongful act.218
While every state and federal fetal homicide law increases recogni-
tion of fetal rights and the harm of domestic violence, every such law,
including Laci and Conner's Law, carries an explicit exception for a
woman's choice to obtain a lawful abortion. This approach has cre-
ated a consistent balancing of maternal, State and fetal rights. The
balance continues to be necessary.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE
ACT IN NORTH CAROLINA
Even before consideration of the State's Unborn Victims of Vio-
lence Act of 2005, North Carolina was noted in the hearings of the
United States House of Representatives in addressing the first at-
tempt at a federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act. As the first to
testify on July 21, 1999, Republican Representative Charles Canady of
Florida opened his testimony with his first example justifying the act:
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act will enable prosecutors to bring
to justice criminals like these: Reginald Anthony Falice, who on April
28, 1998, shot his eight-months pregnant wife, Ruth Croston, five
times as she sat at a red light in Charlotte, North Carolina. Falice was
convicted by a federal grand jury - federal jury just last week for inter-
state domestic violence and using a firearm in the commission of a
violent crime, but because federal law does not currently recognize the
unborn as victims, he received no additional punishment for killing the
near-term infant.
219
The extreme violence of such acts, particularly by a spouse and fa-
ther, is abhorrent. Had the crime been addressed by state law alone,
however, North Carolina law at the time and today, would not have
recognized a separate crime in the killing of the "near-term infant."
In North Carolina, common law continues to define murder and man-
slaughter as the "unlawful killing of a human being, "220 with degrees
of the crimes based on the level of intent. Without statutory guidance
to define a "human being," the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Beale22 relied on common law to hold that a viable unborn
fetus was not a human being for the purpose of the murder statute. In
218. Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 703 (Ind. 2005).
219. Verbatim Transcript, U.S. HR Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution Committee
Hearing (July 21, 1999) at 1999 WL 527771 (F.D.C.H.).
220. State v. Myers, 263 .S.E.2d 768, 772 (1980) (first degree murder); State v. Rick, 463
S.E.2d 182, 186 (1995) (second degree murder); State v. Kea, 124 S.E.2d 174 (1962). N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-17 to 14-18 define the punishments for murder and manslaughter but do not define
the crimes themselves.
221. State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
2006]
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other words, only causing the death of children born alive would be
murder in the State of North Carolina.
In Beale, Donald Ray Beale fired a shotgun at his pregnant wife,
Donna, killing both her and their viable unborn daughter.222 The
North Carolina Supreme Court followed the determination of most
other States that common law murder did not contemplate the killing
of an unborn child: "[i]t is beyond question that when the predecessor
statutes to N.C.G.S. § 4-1 and N.C.G.S. § 14-17 were originally en-
acted in 1715 and 1893 respectively, and when the Declaration of In-
dependence was promulgated in 1776, the killing of a viable, but
unborn child was not murder at common law. ' 223 The Court specifi-
cally left the "creation and expansion of criminal offenses" in this re-
gard to "the legislative branch of the government. ' 224 To date the
North Carolina legislature has chosen not to enact a feticide statute
such as the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.
At the time of the Beale decision in 1989, North Carolina was
among a majority of states that had judicially adopted the common
law born-alive rule for criminal law purposes.225 By 1995, this contin-
ued to be the majority rule.22 6 Today North Carolina is in a small
minority of jurisdictions that continue to follow the common law
born-alive rule for homicide, if only because the State Legislature has
not defined a human being to include the unborn as many other states
have done.227 Missouri's Court of Appeals in State v. Holcomb228
compared North Carolina's Beale decision with that of Arkansas and
Kansas in declining to follow the minority born-alive rule. In the dec-
ade following Holcomb, Arkansas adopted a statute expanding the
definition of a human for criminal statutory purposes to include a via-
ble fetus.229 Kansas and North Carolina adopted sentencing enhance-
ments for injury to a pregnant woman, using language that
emphasized only the harm to the woman and more indirect language
regarding the resultant loss of the fetus.2 3 °
222. Id.
223. Id. at 89.
224. Id. at 92.
225. Gary V. Perko, State v. Beale and the Killing of a Viable Fetus: An Exercise in Statutory
Construction and the Potential for Legislative Reform, 68 N.C.L. REV. 1144, 1147 (1990).
226. Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing - In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey of
North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169, 212 (1995) ("thirty states have adopted the
'born alive' rule by judicial decision").
227. See Section II(A).
228. State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), citing Meadows v. State, 722
S.W.2d 584 (Ark. 1987), and State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678 (Kan. 1989).
229. ARK. STAT. ANN § 5-1-102(13) (Michie 2006).
230. KAN STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (2005) (criminal harm to pregnant woman); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-18.2 (2005) (injury to a pregnant woman).
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Note that North Carolina courts have not addressed whether a mi-
nor may include an unborn child for the purpose of its criminal child
abuse statutes. For example, misdemeanor assault on a child applies
to domestic violence assaults in the presence of a minor and a minor is
defined as any "person" under the age of eighteen.3 Presumably the
courts would follow the reasoning of State v. Beale and require a crim-
inal assault victim to be born alive unless the statute specifically stated
otherwise as it does in its reference to an "unborn child" in the crime
of abortion in North Carolina General Statutes section 14-44.
Effective since 1881, North Carolina's criminal abortion statutes
have applied to women "pregnant or quick with child." The wilful use
of drugs or instruments to destroy an unborn child is a Class H felony
under section 14-44 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Adminis-
tering drugs or using an instrument to procure a miscarriage or to in-
jure or destroy the woman is a Class I felony under section 14-45 of
the North Carolina General Statutes. Judicial interpretations of the
legislative intent of these two statutes have held that the purpose of
section 14-45 is to protect the mother, therefore the age of the fetus in
this section is irrelevant. 232 In contrast, the purpose of section 14-44 is
to protect the fetus.233 For over a century, North Carolina's legisla-
ture has maintained a State interest in the well-being of both pregnant
women and unborn children.
"Quick" with child was not initially defined by statute, but the
North Carolina Supreme Court determined that for the purpose of
N.C. General Statutes section 14-44, at least within the first 30 days
after conception a child could not be quick and no criminal liability
would attach.234 Abortion after Roe became lawful in North Carolina
under certain circumstances, giving pregnant women up to 20 weeks
to choose to terminate the pregnancy without justification:
(a) it shall not be unlawful, during the first 20 weeks of a woman's
pregnancy, to advise, procure, or cause a miscarriage or abortion
when the procedure is performed by a North Carolina licensed
physician practicing in a Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices certified hospital or clinic;
(b) lawful after 20 weeks if pregnancy causes substantial risk to life or
gravely impairs the health of the woman .... 235
231. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(d)(3) (2005).
232. State v. Hoover, 113 S.E.2d 281, 286 (1960).
233. Id. at 233.
234. State v. Jordan, 42 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1947); see also State v. Mills, 21 S.E. 106 (1895)
(referring to 3 Coke Inst. 50 and construing common law definitions of "quick").
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-45.1 (2005).
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Even prior to the enactment of section 14-44, consideration of the
mother's special status was recognized and she'could not be found to
be an accomplice to an illegal abortion procured under this section. 36
In 2005, the North Carolina House failed to pass the "Unborn Vic-
tims of Violence Act," a state law mirroring the federal Laci and Con-
ner's Law.237 House Bill 1324 provided in part:
Section 1. G.S. 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined;
punishment.
(c) Any person who murders a pregnant woman and thereby causes
the death of an unborn child is guilty of a separate offense under
this subsection. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of
this section, the punishment for that separate offense is the same
as the punishment provided under subsection (a) of this section.
An offense under this subsection does not require proof that the
person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had
knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant,
or that the defendant intended to cause the death of the unborn
child.238
The exemptions for the death of a fetus during a lawful abortion
and to protect the health of the mother were contained in subsection
(c):
(c) Nothing in subsection (b) of this section shall be construed to per-
mit the prosecution:
(1) Of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which
the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by
law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such
consent is implied by law.
(2) Of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant wo-
man or her unborn child.
In addition, House Bill 1324 would have replaced the current one
level sentencing enhancement for domestic violence related injury to a
pregnant woman causing injury to the woman and resulting in miscar-
riage or stillbirth.239 The law would replace the enhancement with the
imposition of a separate crime for the death of the fetus as discussed
above. Similar to the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act, this
sentencing enhancement enacted in 1999 applied to the fetus from the
moment of conception, without limiting miscarriages to a certain
"quick" stage of development and including stillbirths "irrespective of
236. State v. Shaft, 81 S.E. 932 (N.C. 1914).
237. H.B. 1324, 2005-2006 Sess. (N.C. 2005).
238. Id.
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2 (1999).
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the duration of pregnancy. '240 A significant difference, however, is
that the enhanced punishment is only imposed if the perpetrator knew
the woman was pregnant, a mens rea requirement not found in the
federal fetal homicide act.
If North Carolina followed the approach of Laci and Conner's Law
and removed the knowledge of pregnancy requirement currently pre-
sent in the State's injury to a pregnant woman enhancement, the legit-
imacy of the legislative purpose would be questioned. Some have
argued that if the punishment does not vary on the degree of evil, but
rather on the degree of bad luck or fortuity in finding after the fact
that the woman was pregnant, then no legitimate purpose could be
served in deterrence or retributivism.2 41 Although many domestic vi-
olence batterers may intend to harm both mother and unborn child,
many intend to harm only the mother that they may have been doing
on a regular basis. Nonetheless, determining the perpetrator's knowl-
edge of the pregnancy would likely be an evidentiary impossibility in
many cases of early pregnancy, but less so if North Carolina adopted
an application of feticide only in cases of later developed fetuses, or
even "quickened" fetuses.
House Bill 1324 would not have clarified this, with its statutory lan-
guage of "unborn child," where "child" remains undefined. The Utah
Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in State v. MacGuire.242 The
murder statute included an "unborn child" victim, the Court deter-
mined that the "the commonsense meaning of the term 'unborn child'
is a human being at any stage of development in utero .... 243 The
California Supreme Court in People v. Taylor would not extend inclu-
sion of the unborn to common law murder, but instead noted it would
have needed clear legislative intent such as statutory language stating
"for the purposes of this section a human being includes a fetus." 244
Unlike Utah, however, the continuing historical precedent of North
Carolina defines the unborn for the purpose of criminal charges such
as the abortion crimes of sections 14-44 and 14-45 as a "quickened"
fetus, not from the moment of conception. As a result, the proposed
Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2005 in North Carolina with its use
of the term "unborn child" could have provided less protection for
fetuses at the earliest stages of development than the already existing
240. Id. at § 14-18.29(a). A miscarriage is defined as "the interruption of the normal devel-
opment of the fetus" other than by live birth or lawful abortion, and a stillbirth as "the death of
the fetus," and both must occur prior to complete expulsion or extraction from the woman. Id.
241. Gerald S. Reamey, The Growing Role of Fortuity in Texas Criminal Law, 47 S. TEx. L.
REV. 59, 95 (2005).
242. State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004).
243. Id.
244. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 890 (Cal. 2004).
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injury to a pregnant woman enhancement, which currently covers mis-
carriages and stillbirths at any stage.
Because the North Carolina legislature has already differentiated
between words such as "child," "miscarriage" and "stillborn" it would
need to specify for every criminal charge it wished to apply to the
unborn whether the unborn are included and at what stage of devel-
opment. In 2000, as a matter of first impression for the Indiana Court
of Appeals, the fact that other statutory crimes, including feticide and
murder, already included terms such as "fetus," and "fetus that has
attained viability," required the Court to interpret the legislative in-
tent behind the crime of criminal neglect of a "dependent" to exclude
the unborn.245 In this case, because the neglect crime did not specify
the inclusion of a fetus, when other statutory crimes did, the legislative
intent could not have anticipated charging a cocaine addicted preg-
nant mother with neglect.
Missouri has one of the most exhaustive statutes ensuring the appli-
cation of criminal liability for the death of the fetus, while still ex-
empting lawful abortion and protecting the mother from prenatal
child endangerment. In 1986, the legislature enacted section 1.205 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri which states:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and
well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable inter-
ests in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. [T]he laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to ac-
knowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of develop-
ment, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other
persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations
thereof by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions
to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn
child" shall include all unborn . . . children or the offspring of
human beings from the moment of conception until birth at every
stage of biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of
action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by
failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any partic-
ular program of prenatal care.2 46
245. Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 2000).
246. See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), motion for reh'g and/or
transfer denied (1997).
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This broad approach would avoid the confusion caused by piece-meal
definitions of a child scattered throughout the statute books. On the
other hand, universal application without discretion, as seen in Mis-
souri's statute, risks unanticipated and possibly undesirable results.
A final consideration is that a feticide statute would likely apply
even if the fetus had no realistic chance of survival due to genetic
disorder or natural illness. The California Court of Appeal upheld a
murder conviction of a defendant who had shot a pregnant woman,
killing her and her unborn child, a child who already suffered from a
fatal medical condition and would not have survived the second tri-
mester.247 The medical condition was determined to be irrelevant,
just as a murder conviction would stand if it "unlawfully shorten[ed]
the existence of a terminally-ill human being ... "248 Clearly North
Carolina has much to consider before it again attempts to join the
ranks of the majority and increase liability to causing harm to the
unborn.
V. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, per the warnings of many of its earliest critics, the
federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act, with its State law predeces-
sors and progeny, has already "color[ed] the abortion debate and the
legal battles of the next century. "249 Nevertheless, the Act does not
bring us new legal concepts, for fetal rights have been protected in
both civil and criminal state law for decades in whole or in part. The
legal debate over fetal homicide laws should not focus on whether one
advocacy group or another fails to care about pregnant women or un-
born children. Social and cultural norms in the United States, and
human instinct, imbue in us a deep care for both, regardless of politi-
cal or cultural affiliation, activist goals, or personal experiences.
Rather the debate must focus on a balance of interests.
If we are to consider the legal distinctions between adult, child and
fetus, examining both rights and duties, then certainly the rights of
adults consistently have been stronger and more numerous than the
limited rights of the child today, and the rights of the child stronger
and more numerous than the rights of the fetus. Nevertheless, the
duties of the State and parent to the child are generally ones of care
and protection, including the maintenance of the health and welfare of
that child. We see this increase in parental duty in stark contrast to
centuries of common law; the State now subjects mothers and fathers
247. People v. Valdez, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, 914 (2005), rev. denied (2005).
248. Id. at 914.
249. Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 215, 234 (2002).
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to higher duties of care, and greater monitoring and intervention by
the State, as seen in the application of child endangerment laws in
fetal abuse and neglect cases. The sheer complexity of the balance
among rights is daunting.
Society has called for higher sanctions against perpetrators who
cause the death of a fetus by inflicting violence against the woman
carrying the fetus in her womb, violence towards the mother of an
unborn child. Although the language of most states that have enacted
feticide statutes distinguish the fetus as a separate person and victim,
even those such as North Carolina that have chosen not to enact an
Unborn Victims of Violence Act may have recognized an added harm
for violence to a pregnant woman through sentencing enhancements.
Regardless of whether the mother views this enhancement or a sepa-
rate charge of feticide as warranted and necessary, the State in enact-
ing such a statute has deemed the fetus worthy of protection even if
not imbued with full personhood. In domestic violence homicides of
pregnant women the mother's view of her pregnancy may never be
known, but the State will have spoken.
What is protected is not only the potentiality of life for the fetus,
and the life of the woman, but the potentiality of motherhood in the
woman. Preserving the exception for lawful abortion for a woman
carrying the fetus is also a way of protecting the potentiality of moth-
erhood. To fully respect the burden and honor of women to be able to
bear children and raise them to adulthood necessitates an understand-
ing that motherhood should be chosen and not forced by the State or
third parties. Domestic violence batterers can both cause unwanted
pregnancy, and physically beat it out of women against their will. Laci
and Conner's Law and similar state statutes recognize this added vio-
lence not only to the fetus, but to the mother as well.
Nevertheless, the abortion exception in these laws recognize that
although unborn children rightfully have been granted limited legal
rights for decades, these human rights are limited initially and increase
through development as they do for born children until the age of
majority. In the very earliest stages of life, the limited level of fetal
rights do not outweigh the liberty interest of pregnant women and the
enormous decisions they must make on behalf of their health, their
lives and their families. They do not outweigh the right to choose
motherhood or to deny it.
In 2001, the United States Surgeon General issued a letter to the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services concerning the sex-
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ual health risks to the nation's citizens.250 In addition to the chal-
lenges of living with sexually transmitted disease and sexual violence,
the Surgeon General listed the over one million abortions which had
occurred in 1996 and the fact that nearly one-half of pregnancies are
unintended.25 1 From a public health stance, he expressed hope for
attaining positive solutions in the face of these challenges:
Given the diversity of attitudes, beliefs, values and opinions, finding
common ground might not be easy but it is attainable. We are more
likely to find this common ground through a national dialogue with
honest and respectful communication. We need to appreciate and re-
spect the diversity of our culture and be informed by the science that
is available to us.252
This message is useful as we engage in dialogue regarding fetal rights,
maternal rights and duties, and sound legal approaches to domestic
violence homicide. As long as the constitutional right to abortion is
respected, North Carolina's choice whether to enact an Unborn Vic-
tims of Violence Act and increase accountability for domestic violence
homicide to pregnant women and their unborn children is one which
may alter the existing legal approach to women and their liberty inter-
ests, but not to the extent of depriving a woman of the right to abor-
tion in the first trimester. As for the rights of the unborn, enacting a
fetal homicide statute would prove groundbreaking in North Carolina
with respect to its impact on the criminal justice system. However,
careful consideration must be taken into account of the potential im-
pact on many other criminal and civil actions, the extent liability
should attach regarding the developmental stage of the fetus, and
whether as a matter of constitutional implication and compassionate
social policy pregnant women should be exempted.
250. United States Department of Health & Human Services, The Surgeon General's Call to
Action to Promote Sexual Health and Responsible Sexual Behavior, A Letter from the Surgeon
General (July 9, 2001).
251. Id.
252. Id.
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